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In a cognitive wireless mesh network, licensed users (primary users, PUs) may rent surplus spectrum to unlicensed users
(secondary users, SUs) for getting some revenue. For such spectrum sharing paradigm, maximizing the revenue is the key objective
of the PUs while that of the SUs is to meet their requirements. These complex contradicting objectives are embedded in our
reinforcement learning (RL) model that is developed and implemented as shown in this paper. The objective function is defined
as the net revenue gained by PUs from renting some of their spectrum. RL is used to extract the optimal control policy that
maximizes the PUs’ profit continuously over time. The extracted policy is used by PUs to manage renting the spectrum to SUs and
it helps PUs to adapt to the changing network conditions. Performance evaluation of the proposed spectrum trading approach
shows that it is able to find the optimal size and price of spectrum for each primary user under diﬀerent conditions. Moreover, the
approach constitutes a framework for studying, synthesizing and optimizing other schemes. Another contribution is proposing a
new distributed algorithm to manage spectrum sharing among PUs. In our scheme, PUs exchange channels dynamically based on
the availability of neighbor’s idle channels. In our cooperative scheme, the objective of spectrum sharing is to maximize the total
revenue and utilize spectrum eﬃciently. Compared to the poverty-line heuristic that does not consider the availability of unused
spectrum, our scheme has the advantage of utilizing spectrum eﬃciently.
1. Introduction
With the explosion of the number of emerging wireless appli-
cations for mobile users, the frequency spectrum has become
congested to support the dramatic increase in the demand for
the limited spectrum. Moreover, traditional spectrum man-
agement policies have contributed significantly in spectrum
scarcity crisis [1]. In such schemes, the licensed spectrum is
used only by the owner of license; other users are prevented
from utilizing the unused spectrum. Consequently, spectrum
owners are prevented from real-time interaction with radio
environment and from determining appropriate communi-
cation parameters and adapting to the changes in the radio
environment. For example, to increase data transfer rate and
avoid interference, the wireless system may detect and switch
to another lightly crowded band.
Fixed spectrum assignment policies prevent users from
dynamically utilizing unused allocated spectrum; hence poor
utilization and spectrum holes will be resulted.Moreover, the
owner loses the profits from renting the unused spectrum.
In wireless technology, another challenge is guaranteeing the
QoS of applications that require huge bandwidth resources
and service continuity protection [1]. To overcome the
spectrum scarcity problem, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) allows SUs to use unutilized spectrum
if they do not interfere with PUs [1–3]. Recently, wireless
mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a significant new
technology that can provide ease of installation, low-cost
means for flexible, and fast deployment of Internet-based
services in diverse environments [1–3]. In order to become
a mature technology, WMNs need to oﬀer multimedia and
emergency services that require more bandwidth resources.
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Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is proposed to mitigate
spectrum scarcity through utilizing spectrum eﬃciently. It
also enables users to adjust communication parameters (such
as operating frequency, transmission power, and modulation
scheme) in response to the changes in the radio envi-
ronment [1–3]. DSA enables implementation of cognitive
radio (CR) that brings a promise to increase spectrum
at a minimum cost by using licensed spectrum whenever
spectrum owners do not use it. This approach provides
up to 85% of the unused spectrum [1]. CR also enhances
the capability of WMNs to support broadband systems.
CR encourages implementing new more flexible spectrum
sharing paradigms. These sharing paradigms include the use
of trading spectrum access on secondary market where PUs
can rent unused spectrum to SUs and generate more revenue
[3]. Despite of obvious advantages of using CR in WMNs,
there are still several issues that require more investigation
such as economic factors that include PUs revenues and SUs
satisfaction. Spectrum trading also presents the challenge
of sharing spectrum among primary users. This paper
addresses when and how spectrum is shared among PUs
and between primary and secondary users. Spectrum is
shared between PUs and SUs based on our economic
model and under dynamic traﬃc load conditions. Our
economic model includes the costs and revenues associated
with renting a spectrum. The cost of renting spectrum is
a reduction of spectrum for PUs in favor of increasing
revenue.
In our work, PUs borrow channels from other PUs. Our
design objective is to improve spectrum utilization (among
PUs) and maximize revenue for spectrum owners (spectrum
trading), while meeting some defined constraints. In order
to develop an intelligent radio that is able to deal with
conflicting objectives in radio environment, we propose to
use reinforcement learning which is an eﬀective tool to deal
with rational entities that make decisions to maximize their
benefits with whatever little information they have [4]. It
provides a mathematical framework for modeling decision-
making in situations where the decision maker is not sure
about the outcome.
In our work, reinforcement learning (RL) is used as a
means for extracting an optimal policy that helps a PU to
adapt to the changing radio environment conditions. PUs
employ the extracted optimal policy to solve the following
dilemma. When a request for spectrum arrives, the PU
recognizes that it should give part of its spectrum to gain
the revenue from rent. However, the QoS for PU might
be degraded due to renting the spectrum. The PU might
reject serving because it needs this spectrum and loses the
reward. As a result, the PU waits for its demand for the
spectrum to subside before renting spectrum. Consequently,
the likelihood of losing a reward of serving SUs increases,
which pushes the PU to become more spectrum-demanded
in order to reduce its loss. Under the emerging secondary
market spectrum policy, when renting available spectrum
to other parties (i.e., PU, SU), the PUs need to consider
the economic factors, such as the spectrum price and the
operation revenue obtained. We formulate this spectrum
trading problem as a revenue maximization problem. Such a
formulation allows RL to optimize the trading problem. The
contributions of our paper are as follows.
(i) A new spectrum-sharing scheme among PUs is pro-
posed.
(ii) How the concept of RL can be used to obtain a com-
putationally feasible solution to the considered spec-
trum trading problem is described.
(iii) An extensive numerical evaluation, based on analysis
and simulation, of the RL-based method for spec-
trum trading is presented.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly,
we present previous work in spectrum sharing and trading,
followed by our assumptions and work environment. We
then describe our spectrum sharing scheme and formulate
the spectrum trading problem. In the next section, we
describe our model for solving the problem using RL,
and illustrate its implementation and how we optimize
obtained revenues using the RL algorithm. Next, we present
some of the tests performed and show the behavior of the
implemented system under diﬀerent conditions. Finally, our
last section concludes the paper.
2. Related Work of Spectrum Trading Using CRs
In a cognitive network, PUs can rent their unused spectrum
to SUs. The problem of spectrum trading was considered
in [5] where each node charges other nodes for relaying
its traﬃc. The objective function is defined as the revenue
obtained from transmitting the node traﬃc plus other nodes
charges minus the price paid for other nodes along the
route to the destination. In [6], multiple PUs sell unused
spectrum resources to SUs to get monetary gains while SUs
try to get permissions from PUs for accessing the rented
spectrum. In order to maximize the payoﬀs of both primary
and secondary users, game theory is used to coordinate the
spectrum allocation among primary and secondary users
through a trading process. The payoﬀ of a PU is defined as
the diﬀerence between the price of the sold spectrum and
the cost of buying spectrum. However, the model does not
consider the QoS of PUs.
In the framework proposed in [7], a PU may lease
the owned spectrum to SUs in exchange for cooperation
in the form of distributed space-time coding. For the PU,
the main concern is maximizing its quality of service in
terms of either rate or probability of outage, accounting
for the possible contribution from cooperation. However,
SUs compete among themselves for transmission within
the leased time slot following a distributed power control
mechanism. PU charges SUs for the leased spectrum in
[8]. The problem is formulated as an oligopoly market
competition and a noncooperative game is used to obtain the
spectrum allocation for SUs. Nash equilibrium is considered
as the solution of this game. In [9], it is extended to multiple
PUs selling the spectrum to SUs. The model considers the
behavior of other PUs to specify the price of spectrum. In
[10], the advantages of employing market forces to address
the issues of wireless spectrum congestion and the allocation
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of spectrum are addressed. It is shown that when unlicensed
spectrum is assigned to all competing SUs during periods
of excess demand an ineﬃcient outcome is likely to result.
PUs compete to sell a spectrum to a set of buyers in [11].
Game theoretic approach is proposed to obtain the selling
quantities and bidding price.
Several studies tackle the issue of spectrum sharing
among PUs. In [12], PUs compete with each other to get
the spectrum. To analyze the dynamic spectrum allocation
of the unused spectrum bands to PUs, an auction theory
was used. The problem was formulated as a multiunit
sealed-bid sequential and concurrent auction. In [13], PUs
dynamically compete for portions of available spectrum. PUs
are charged by the spectrum policy server for the amount
of bandwidth they use in their services. The competition
problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game and new
iterative bidding scheme that achieves Nash equilibrium of
the operator game is proposed. In the proposed system in
[14], two spectrum brokers oﬀer a spectrum for a group of
PUs. The broker wants tomaximize its own revenue. Brokers’
revenues are modeled as the payoﬀs that they gain from the
game. On the other hand, PUs want tomaximize its ownQoS
satisfaction at minimum expense.
Centralized regional spectrum broker distributes a spec-
trum among PUs in [15]. PUs do not own any spectrum;
instead they obtain time bound rights from a regional
spectrum broker to part of the spectrum and configure it to
oﬀer the network service. In [16], users adjust their spectrum
usage based on a defined threshold called poverty line. A PU
can borrow from its neighbors if the neighbors have number
of idle channels greater than a poverty line. However, this
scheme does not consider the availability of channels and the
load of PU. It is possible that the neighbors have a number of
idle channels less than their poverty line and these channels
will be unused. Moreover, none of these schemes consider
what follows.
(i) Utilizing spectrum eﬃciently: spectrum owners com-
pete for spectrum to maximize their revenues regard-
less of eﬃcient spectrum utilization.
(ii) Maximizing total revenues of PUs through utilizing
the whole spectrum: the cooperation between PUs
to maximize total revenues is neglected in these
schemes.
(iii) Learning PUs a control policy to adapt the oﬀered size
of spectrum and spectrum price based on the changes
in the radio environment such as traﬃc load, cost of
services, and spectrum price.
Using simulations, we show the ability of our scheme to
utilize spectrum eﬃciently by comparing its performance
with the poverty-line scheme. Moreover, we conduct some
experiments to show how our scheme can adapt to diﬀerent
network conditions such as traﬃc load and spectrum cost.
3. Network Overview
In this section, we present our assumptions. The network
consists of two types of nodes: mesh routers (MRs) andmesh
clients (MCs). A wireless mesh network has several MRs
that jointly form a cluster [17]. Each cluster is a WLAN,
where MRs play the role of access point and the MCs
act as nodes served by them. The algorithm proposed in
[17] is used to form and maintain clusters. Moreover, the
proposed signaling protocol in [17] is used to manage
communication among the PUs and the SUs. MRs have
fixed locations, whereas MCs are moving and changing
their places arbitrarily. The spectrum is divided into non-
overlapping channels which are the basic unit of allocation.
The network consists of W PUs and N SUs. We define a PU
as a spectrum owner that may rent a spectrum to other users.
Each PU has K channels assigned to it in advance. Each
PU oﬀers an adaptable number of channels to MRs (SUs).
MRs use the rented spectrum to serve MCs. We assume that
spectrum-request arrival follows Poisson distribution with
arrival rate λ (the mean number of requests arriving per
unit time). The service rate for incoming request is assumed
to be exponentially distributed with service rate μ. These
assumptions capture some reality of wireless applications
such as phone call traﬃc.
4. Spectrum Trading Model
In this section, we formulate a theoretical model that is
used to describe the general spectrum trading problem
between PUs and SUs. Next we describe our on-demand-
based spectrum sharing scheme and define the constraints
of borrowing a spectrum among PUs.
4.1. Spectrum Trading Problem Formulation. In our model,
we define the components for primary user y(PUy) as
follows.
(i) Spectrum allocation vector SPy :
SPy = {SPy(m) | SPy(m) ∈ {0, 1}} is a vector of
spectrum status. If SPy(m) = 1, channel m is not
available currently. Spectrum status changes over
time according to the spectrum demand.
(ii) Interference vector Iy :
Iy = {Iy(i) | Iy(i) ∈ {0, 1}} is a vector that represents
the interference among PUy and other PUs; if Iy(i) =
1, then PUy and PUi cannot use the same channel at
the same time because they would interfere with each
other.
(iii) Channel reward vector Ry :
Ry = {Ry(m) | Ry(m) ∈ {0,∞}}is a channel reward
vector, which describes the reward that PUy gets by
successfully renting channels to SUs. Ry(m) is the
reward that PUy gets from renting channel m. It is
computed as follows:
Ry(m) = pμωm, (1)
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where p is spectrum price for renting a channel m
and ωm represents the quality of wireless transmis-
sion for channel m and is computed as follows:
ωm = C{m}arg max
z
C{z} , (2)
where C{m} is the capacity of channel m and is
computed using Shannon’s formula. To fit the reward
function in (1), channel m’s capacity is normalized
by the largest capacity among all channels. It is clear
from (2) the channel with higher capacity provides
high-quality communication and it should get higher
reward than others. The average reward for a PU is
computed mathematically as follows:
R = rλ, (3)
where r is the reward of serving one request, and λ is




where Ac is the number of accepted requests, and Tr
is the total number of requests. Equation (3) is used
to compute analytical reward for a PU. The total
reward TRy is the following:
TRy = SPy · Rty , (5)
where Rty is transpose of the channel reward vector.
(iv) Borrowable channel set BCy :
our scheme allows two neighbors to exchange chan-
nels to maximize their reward while complying with
conflict constraint from set of the neighbors. We
define that two PUs are neighbors if their transmis-
sion coverage area is overlapped with each other. The
set of channels that PUy can borrow from PU j should
not interfere with PUy neighbors. We refer to these
channels as BCy(PUy , PU j):
BCy
(















where L gives the set of channels assigned to the
given user(s) (e.g., L(PU j) represents the list of PU j
channels); G(PUy) is a list of neighbors of a primary
user PUy .
4.2. On-Demand-Based Spectrum Sharing Scheme. In our
scheme, PUs can exchange channels if the borrowed channels
do not interfere with the channels of neighbors. After serving
a request, the PU returns back borrowed channels to the
owner users. PUs adjust their spectrum usage based on
demand. As a result, the PU decides to borrow channels if
the spectrum is not available to accommodate SUs requests
and it is profitable to serve new SUs in terms of revenue. In
our scheme, spectrum is shared among PUs as follows.
Step 1. PU computes the revenue of serving new SUs.
Step 2. If the revenue is positive and worthy, a PU requests
neighboring PUs for a spectrum through a “borrowing
frame” that is broadcast to all neighbors. The request frame
specifies the size of required spectrum.
Step 3. Each PU receives a “borrowing frame,” checks its
idle channel list, and if there are idle channels, the PU
temporarily gives up a certain amount of idle spectrum and
sends an “accept frame” that includes channel IDs. If all
channels are busy then the request is ignored.
Step 4. After receiving “accept frame(s),” the PU specifies a
borrowable channel set BC and ranks its elements based on
their capacity. If the PU does not receive any “accept frame,”
it queues the requests.
Step 5. After selecting channels, the PU informs the owners
of the selected channels.
Step 6. After the PU finishes serving SUs, it returns the
borrowed channels.
Our scheme guarantees high utilization through using all
system channels provided that the interference constraint is
met.
5. Reinforcement Learning-Based Model
Reinforcement learning is a subarea of machine learning
concerned with how a system administrator takes actions in
diﬀerent circumstances in a work environment to maximize
long-term revenue [4]. Let X = {X0,X1,X2,X3, . . . ,Xt} be
the set of possible states an environment may be in, and let
A = {a0, a1, a2, . . . , at} be a set of actions a learning agent
may take. In RL, a policy is any function: π : X → A
that maps states to actions. Each policy gives a sequence of
states when executed as follows: X0 → X1→ X2 . . . where
Xt represents the system state at time t and at is the action
at time t. Given the state Xt, the learning agent interacts
with the environment by choosing an action at , then the
environment gives a reward rt and the system transits to the
new state Xt+1 according to the transition probability PX ,Xt+1
and the process is repeated. The goal of agent is to find
an optimal policy π∗(X) which maximizes the total reward
over time. In this section, we define RL model applicable to
control the spectrum trading.
5.1. Basic Formulation of RL Model. For the basic formula-
tion, we describe the elements that facilitate the definition
of the RL. These elements are the events and states of the
system. Each PU has one finite FIFO queue for SUs (MRs)
requests. The PU uses extracted optimal control policy to
decide whether it is worthy to increase the oﬀered spectrum
for a new request or queue it. The request is added to the tail
of the queue if a spectrum is insuﬃcient to accommodate it
and a PU fails to borrow a spectrum from other PUs. The
request is served if the PU has suﬃcient spectrum. However,
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if a queue is full, the request is rejected. In our work, the agent
is developed to be implemented at the PU level of WMN in
a distributed manner. It provides the trading functionality
for a single queue. Each agent uses its local information and
makes a decision for the events occurring in the PU in which
it is located.
In our model, we have an adaptable spectrum size, f (Xt),
according to the percentage of queue usage (traﬃc load) and
the gained revenue. At time t, the state of the system Xt is
the number of accepted requests. Accepted requests is served
immediately if there is adequate spectrum or they might
be placed in the queue. Let {Xt, t ≥ 0} denote a random
variable which represents system states, X is the state space.
At state Xt, spectrum size f (Xt) is used to serve the queued
requests with a service rate f (Xt)μ. Transition from one state
to another means a request arrival or the SU is served. All
possible states are limited by the following constraints:
(i) Xt ≤ QS, where QS is the maximum length of the
queue.
(ii) f (Xt) ≤ KW ,
where K and W are defined in Section 3. From a state, the
system cannot make a transition (arrive, depart) unless the
constraints are met.
5.2. Spectrum Trading Agent and State Space. In our system,
an event can occur in a PU (agent) when a new request for
spectrum arrives or a SU releases its assigned spectrum.
These events are modeled as stochastic variables with
appropriate probability distribution. At any time the PU is
in a particular configuration defined by the size of oﬀered
spectrum for trading, the price of spectrum, and the number
of admitted SUs.
In our case, each time a request for spectrum arrives
one of the following decisions must be made: accept arrival
request or reject the request. Upon serving the request, a PU
has to decide the optimal oﬀered-spectrum size for renting.
The action space is given by
A = {a : a ∈ {0, 1}}, (7)
where a = 0 denotes request rejection, a = 1 indicates that
the PU has accepted the request and it might be placed in the
queue if the spectrum is insuﬃcient to accommodate it.
5.3. Model Optimization. In our model, the value f (Xt)
indicates the optimal spectrum size oﬀered for SUs at state
Xt that maximizes the estimated mean value of revenue,
V(π∗) = R− C, (8)
where R is the average reward given in (3) and C is the cost
of renting spectrum to the SUs and is computed as follows:
C = f (Xt)∗ δ, (9)
where δ is the cost of renting one spectrum unit to SUs. Due
to spectrum renting, the spectrum remaining for the primary
user becomes smaller; hence its QoS is degraded. The rate of
revenue at state Xt is computed as
q(Xt) = at
(
r ∗ Xt ∗ f (Xt)μ− C
)
, (10)
where r is the reward for renting spectrum and is computed
using (1). The actual mean value of the net revenue under






whereAy indicates the average actual value of the net revenue
of PUy when policy π is executed and D represents the time
horizon. The state transition probability is given by
PXt ,Xt+1 (a) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λ, Xt+1 = Xt + 1




where Xt represents current state and Xt+1 is the next tran-
sited state. In our system, an event can occur in a PU (agent)
when a new request for spectrum arrives or a SU releases its
assigned spectrum. These events are modeled as stochastic
variables with appropriate probability distribution. Hence,
the state transition occurs when a request arrives or is served
and this is shown in (12).
5.4. Optimal Policy. The optimal policy gives the maximum
net revenue when a PU adopts it. It specifies the optimal
spectrum size and price for each state. Basically, in our
model the optimal policy is specified according to the average
revenue value obtained for each transition with the oﬀered
spectrum size. For each state, the revenue gained depends
on the action reward, cost of spectrum, and the spectrum
demand. When a new spectrum request arrives at the queue,
the PU checks if it is worthy to increase the oﬀered spectrum
based on the revenue gained. It then either increases the
oﬀered spectrum or keeps it. When a SU departs from the
system the PU may decrease the oﬀered spectrum based on
revenue. Although decreasing the size of spectrum decreases
the customers’ satisfaction—since their waiting time will
increase accordingly—the PU always chooses the action that
maximizes its revenue. In our work, a PU uses RL to choose
a policy, π : X → A, for deciding the next action at based on
the current state Xt. We apply a value iteration algorithm to
find an optimal policy. The value function [4] of policy π is
given as





where α is the discount revenue that satisfies 0 ≤ α < 1 and
starting with t = 0. The value function Vπ(Xt) can be
considered as the expected revenue for policy π starting from
state X0. The optimal value function is given [4] as
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We define an optimal policy π∗ as follows:
Hy(π∗) ≥ Hy(π), (16)







5.5. Analytical Model for Spectrum Trading. Network condi-
tions are changing randomly. These conditions include traﬃc
level, spectrum cost, and the size of unused spectrum. As a
consequence, PUs should adapt to continue increasing the
revenue. The principal parameters that PUs control are the
price and the size of the oﬀered spectrum. In our model,
the PUs’ revenues sensitivity to the number of the oﬀered




















We assume the average reward sensitivity to the spectrum
size can be approximated by the cost of accepting new SUs,
u, which is calculated as follows:
u = r − o, (19)
where o is the reward increment from accepting new
requests. Substituting in (18), the PU’s revenue is maximized
when spectrum size equals the root of
∂V
∂ f (Xt)







We used Newton’s method of successive linear approx-
imations to find the root of (20). The new spectrum size
f (Xt)n+1 at each iteration step n is computed as follows:







)− δ)/∂ f (Xt) . (21)













∼= un − un−1
f (Xt)n − f (Xt)n−1
(22)
and substituting (22) in (21), the new spectrum size will be
f (Xt)n+1 = f (Xt)n −
(
f (Xt)n − f (Xt)n−1
) un − δ
un − un−1 . (23)
Spectrum size adaptation is then realized using
Algorithm 1, where ε is the tolerable error. The presented
solution for revenue maximization does not take into
account the QoS of PUs. The request of spectrum from the
PU is blocked if it arrives while a PU is already using all of its
spectrum. Therefore, the probability of blocking for PUy is

















Although for optimal spectrum size and price, one can
expect that standard blocking constraint of PUs will be met.
However, in some scenarios the blocking probabilities may
exceed the constraints. To cope with this constraint, we
use a spectrum price for controlling the size of the oﬀered
spectrum and meeting the blocking probability for the PUs.
It is clear when a PU increases the price of spectrum the
arrival rate of SUs and the demand of spectrum will be
decreased. The arrival rate depends on the oﬀered price. The
new arrival rate of SUs is calculated as follows [19]:
λ = τe−ϕp´, (26)
where τ is the maximum number of users arriving to a
PU, ϕ represents the rate of decrease of the arrival rate as
spectrum price increases and is related to the degree of
competition between the PUs, and p´ is the new price. Here,
we assume ϕ is given a priori. There is an inverse relationship
between the price and the demand of the spectrum. A PU
has to meet its blocking probability constraint BCy . Blocking
probability depends on the number of available channels
and the traﬃc load. If the blocking probability for a PU
exceeds the blocking constraint, a PU continues to increase
the spectrum price till its blocking probability is met. Because
of the inverse relationship between spectrum price and its
demand, it can be easily shown that when a spectrum price
is increased the available channel for a PU will be increased
and therefore the blocking probability will be reduced. This
feature indicates that if a PUy blocking constraint BCy is not
met, By > BCy , the spectrum price is increased to fulfill the
blocking probability constraint. However, we assume that the
potential price increment should be minimized as possible as
it can keep the demand for spectrum-high and maximize the
PUs revenues. After increasing the spectrum price, the new
revenue is computed as follows:
ΔV´ = λ( p´ − p)− C. (27)
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AdaptSpectrumSize (un, f (Xt)n, f (Xt)n−1, δ, ε)
begin




compute new value of un and f (Xt)n+1;




This leads to the following problem formulation:
max
f (Xt)













By ≤ BCy ,
Δ ´V =λ( p´ − p)− C ≥ 0.
(28)
In our proposed adaptation scheme the new values of
spectrum prices reflect the amount of spectrum required by a
PU. Due to the competition in the market, a price increment
is limited due to the possibility of losing customers. If a
blocking constraint for a PU is met it tries to meet the block-
ing constraint for SUs by increasing the oﬀered spectrum size
using the AdaptSpectrumSize algorithm.
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we show simulation results to demonstrate
the ability of our spectrum scheme to adapt to diﬀerent
network conditions. The system of PUs and SUs is imple-
mented as a discrete event simulation. The simulation is
written by using Matlab. We uniformly distribute 10 PUs
and each PU is randomly assigned 20 channels. For the
mesh network, 100MCs are distributed uniformly in the
transmission region of the MRs. The results presented are for
several system settings scenarios in order to show the eﬀect
of changing some of the control parameters. The network
parameters chosen for evaluating the algorithm and the
methodology of the simulation are shown in Table 1.
6.1. Impact of Spectrum Size and Number of Primary Users
on Spectrum Borrowing among PUs. Simulations are done
to explore the availability of channels that can be borrowed
under diﬀerent configurations of spectrum size and primary
user deployment. We vary the number of PUs and the
number of channels (spectrum size). We assume that two
users interfere if the distance between them is less than
20m and they use the same channel. Figure 1 shows the
Table 1: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Number of mesh routers 10
Number of clients 100
Number of primary users 10
Number of channels per a PU 20
Total number of channels 200
Number of messages per client Random
Type of interface per node 802.11 b
MAC layer IEEE 802.11 b
Transmission power 0.1 watt
Packet size 512
λ 1
Channel bandwidth 100 kHz
Blocking probably constraint for a PU 0.015
SNR 4 db
borrowing probability for diﬀerent numbers of PUs. We
calculate the probability of existing channels being available
for borrowing. Simulations are done to investigate the
eﬀect of the number of PUs on the probability of channel
borrowing. We can see that the possibility of adjusting
spectrum based on borrowing is not guaranteed for a large
number of PUs with a small size of spectrum. Moreover, it
can be seen that increasing the number of PUs, the borrowing
probability decreases due to the interference among users.
The spectrum size is another factor that influences channel
borrowing probability. Increasing the size of spectrum (i.e.,
increasing the number of channels in the system) reduces the
likelihood of interference.
6.2. Performance of On-Demand Sharing Scheme. We com-
pare the performance of our on-demand-based spectrum
sharing scheme with the poverty-line heuristic [16] through
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Spectrum size = 100
Spectrum size = 90
Spectrum size = 80
Spectrum size = 70






































Figure 2: Throughput and spectrum utilization comparison.
The performance metrics considered are as follows.
(1) Throughput, which is the average rate of successful
message delivery over a communication channel
which can be expressed as follows:
Throughput = total no. of bytes received
simulation time
. (30)
(2) Spectrum utilization, S, which is the percentage of






We examine the performance under diﬀerent parameter
settings. Throughput comparison of the two schemes is





















Figure 3: Average revenue sensitivity versus number of PUs in
cognitive network.
shown in Figure 2. The figure shows that the throughput
increases as the total number of channels increases. This is
due to more spectrum that can be employed. Our scheme
utilizes the unused spectrum resourcefully because there is
no limit to channel borrowing among PUs. For poverty-
line heuristic [16], a PU cannot exceed a certain number of
channels that can be borrowed from its neighbors even if the
neighbors have idle channels.
We further present the results of spectrum utilization
with diﬀerent spectrum sizes in Figure 2. Our scheme
performs better than the poverty-line heuristic. Our scheme
utilizes the whole spectrum because PUs can have access to
neighbor’s channels based on availability of channels and on-
demand. This improves the cognitive network throughput
and overall spectrum utilization. However, some unused
spectrum is not utilized under poverty-line heuristic because
of the threshold constraint. It is clear from Figure 2 that
our scheme is not sensitive to the number of channels in
the network. However, the only constraint that prevents our
scheme from full utilization of spectrum is the interference
factor. In the poverty-line-based scheme, spectrum sharing
is limited by the poverty line that depends on the number of
idle channels. From the figure, we can see that as the number
of channels increases the utilization of channels decreases
because of an increment in idle channels.
Figure 3 displays the result of spectrum trading. The
result shows that our scheme achieves higher revenue than
poverty-line scheme. The revenue decreases as the number
of PUs increases, since in this case PUs are assigned less
number of channels; therefore the size of oﬀered spectrum
will decrease. We also compare the performance of the two
schemes under varying traﬃc load in Figure 4. The result
shows that the revenue increases as the spectrum demand
increases.
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Figure 4: Average revenue sensitivity versus arrival rate.


















Analytical results for network without CR
Simulation results for network without CR
Analytical results for network with CR
Simulation results for network with CR
Figure 5: Oﬀered traﬃc for WMNs with and without CR abilities
(blocking probability).
6.3. Supporting QoS for SUs in CRs. In this section, we
explore the performance of WMNs with cognitive abilities.
CRs take advantage of surplus spectrum by renting it to
the SUs and getting profits. Figure 5 shows a comparison
between the traﬃc for WMNs with CR abilities and WMNs
without CR abilities. Clearly, the cognitive systems outper-
form the classic WMNs that do not use CR technology. The
main disadvantage of CRs is the waiting time of flows. This is
a direct consequence of the PUs requirement of not renting a
surplus spectrum if there is no revenue. However, despite the
PUs requirement, the overall performance is far better when




























Figure 6: Adapting spectrum size to meet blocking probability
constraint.
have a priority over SUs. Each PU needs a spectrum for its
usage and to support the maximum classic traﬃc for (BCy ≤
1%) constraint. If an additional network overlays its traﬃc
over the unused spectrum it should not aﬀect the BCy of the
PUs.
6.4. Spectrum Price Adaptation. A PU with well-dimen-
sioned spectrum size and correctly chosen spectrum price
provides the desired QoS and maintains blocking probabil-
ities in an acceptable range. When the spectrum demand
increases, blocking probabilities normally increase beyond
their constraints. While our adaptation scheme tries to
maximize PUs’ revenues by increasing spectrum size when
the spectrum demand increases, it maintains QoS by bring-
ing blocking probabilities back to its constrained range by
increasing the spectrum price. Our intelligent algorithm
is converged after 4 steps. Figure 6 displays the oﬀered
spectrum size at PUy for diﬀerent arrival rates. When
spectrum arrival rate is increased and blocking probability
does not surpass BCy , PUy adapts by increasing the size of
the oﬀered spectrum as shown in the figure to generate more
revenue. However, when the demand decreases, PUy reduces
the size of the oﬀered spectrum to avoid a waste of spectrum.
We study the eﬀect of spectrum adaptation on the gained
revenue for diﬀerent oﬀered spectrum sizes in Figure 7.
The results show that our algorithm increases the oﬀered
spectrum size to gain more revenue. When the oﬀered
spectrum becomes large the quality of service of PU may
be degraded because of the reduction of its spectrum size.
Therefore, the adaptation scheme stop increasing the oﬀered
spectrum. Figure 7 also shows the size of oﬀered spectrum
for diﬀerent service costs. It is clear the adaptation scheme
oﬀers more spectrum when the cost of serving SUs is low.
When a PUy oﬀers large size of spectrum, its blocking
probability By may surpass its blocking constraint BCy . The
spectrum price adaptation is integrated in our adaptation



























Figure 7: Adapting spectrum size for diﬀerent service cost and the
gained average revenue for the adaptation scheme.























Figure 8: Adapting spectrum price to meet blocking probability
constraint.
process to ensure it meets the blocking constraints. Figure 8
shows the spectrum price adaptation when the blocking
probability surpasses blocking constraint. PU increases the
price of spectrum to decrease the accepting rate for each SUs
class and to maintain QoS for PUs. The results show our
scheme’s ability to bring blocking probabilities back to their
constrained range by adapting spectrum price.
6.5. Tradeoﬀs between a PU Revenue and QoS Constraints.
Figure 9 plots the tradeoﬀ between a PU revenue and its
QoS. To show the relationship between the two, we vary
the blocking probability constraint for a PU (the QoS
requirement for a PU). Blocking constraint becomes stricter






























Figure 9: Oﬀered spectrum for diﬀerent blocking network con-
strains.
protected from channel eviction. For this, SUs arrivals must
be blocked more often and the rejection ratio is increased. As
a result, a PU cannot oﬀer more spectrum for a small value of
blocking probability. However, as this constraint is relaxed,
a PU can serve more SUs and can oﬀer more spectrum
to generate more revenue. For large values of blocking
probability, a PU can maintain a QoS for its applications and
this can be observed from the figure. The revenue gained for
large values of blocking probability is increased and a PU
becomes less strict so that a lower number of SUs are rejected
upon their arrival.
6.6. Optimal Policy as a Function of Spectrum Price, Cost, and
Quality. We simulate the behavior of the described system
under diﬀerent spectrum prices. Figure 10 displays the size
of the oﬀered spectrum for diﬀerent service prices. From the
figure, we can clearly see that even though spectrum prices
are higher a PUmay increase the oﬀered spectrum size. There
is a direct correlation between the oﬀered spectrum size and
the spectrum price, so the more reward we have (due to
price) the more spectrum PU can oﬀer SUs. However, a PU
cannot further increase the price because it will aﬀect SU’s
spectrum demand.
We compare the same system for diﬀerent cost of service
(δ) in Figure 11 for a fixed spectrum price. From the figure,
we clearly notice how sensitive the optimal size of oﬀered
spectrum is to the spectrum cost, where the oﬀered size
drops as spectrum cost increases. Figure 12 shows the oﬀered
spectrum size as a function of spectrum quality (ω). It is clear
as the spectrum quality improves, the PU will oﬀer more
spectrum increasing its reward.
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Spectrum price = 6
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Steps over time (t)
Figure 10: Optimal policy as a function of spectrum prices.




























Figure 11: Oﬀered spectrum size for diﬀerent spectrum cost.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel machine-learning-based
model to obtain an optimal policy for controlling spectrum
trading in cognitive wireless networks. The proposed model
has two contributions to cognitive networks. From the
application side, the main contribution is developing a
control policy that considers diﬀerent requirements such
as rewards for PUs, wireless requirement (channel inter-
ference), the cost of spectrum renting, and PUs QoS.
All basic functions are integrated and optimized into one
homogenous, theoretically based model. From the modeling




























Figure 12: Oﬀered spectrum size as a function of spectrum quality.
side, we formulate a spectrum trading problem as a reward
maximization problem. Such a formulation allows RL to
optimize the trading problem. The approach presents a
general framework for studying, analyzing, and optimizing
other resource management in cognitive mesh networks.
Another contribution is to propose a new scheme for the
PUs to control spectrum trading for the emerging spectrum
secondary market. PUs can employ the proposed scheme to
choose the optimal price and size of the oﬀered spectrum.
The objective is to adapt the size and price of spectrum
in order to continuously maximize PUs’ net revenues while
maintaining PUs’ QoS. Simulations were also conducted
and shown to closely agree with the analytical model.
They demonstrated the ability of our algorithm to support
SUs requirements and obtain the potential performance
gains by applying cognitive radio. Moreover, the numerical
results show that the proposed approach is able to find an
eﬃcient tradeoﬀ between diﬀerent rates of spectrum size and
diﬀerent costs of spectrum. The results show the ability of
our scheme to find the optimal spectrum size for diﬀerent
spectrum prices. We vary system parameters to understand
the behavior of the system under diﬀerent scenarios. The
results show a direct correlation between the reward rates and
the spectrum price, and an inverse relationship between the
spectrum cost and the allocated bandwidth. We also propose
a new distributed spectrum sharing scheme among primary
users. PUs share spectrum based on demand whereby they
can borrow spectrum from their neighbors while complying
with interference rules. The benchmark in our experiments is
the poverty-line heuristic used in [16]. Because it can more
eﬃciently employ limited spectrum resources compared to
the poverty-line heuristic, our scheme achieves higher net
revenues. The poverty-line heuristic restricts borrowing by
a threshold called poverty line. Moreover, numerical results
12 Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering
show that our scheme is able to find an eﬃcient tradeoﬀ
between PU revenues and SUs delay.
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